Archives de catégorie : Allemagne / Germany

Solidarité en crise ? Les socialistes français, allemands et italiens face aux crises diplomatiques à l’époque de la IIe Internationale (1889-1915)

Le présent billet est issu de la communication d’Elisa Marcobelli lors de la journée d’étude consacrée à Georges Haupt dont les interventions filmées peuvent être trouvées ici

Solidarité en crise ? Les socialistes français, allemands et italiens face aux crises diplomatiques à l’époque de la II Internationale (1889-1915)

 

 

marcobelli

 

L’opposition à la guerre de la IIe Internationale se résume souvent à un mot : « l’échec » ; celui de 1914. Or, ce jugement est réducteur et tend à lire toute l’existence de cette organisation en fonction de l’événement qui a marqué sa fin. Notre thèse propose d’étudier l’évolution de l’Internationale sans projeter sur celle-ci le déclenchement funeste de la Première Guerre mondiale : elle analyse le combat contre la guerre des socialistes français, allemands et italiens, au sein de l’Internationale et  dans chaque espace national. L’attention est particulièrement centrée sur le positionnement des socialistes pendant les crises diplomatiques internationales qui se succédèrent au début du XXe siècle. Il en ressort un constat ambivalent. D’un côté, les efforts de l’Internationale contre la guerre ne peuvent plus être considérés comme un échec. L’institution a bien réussi à créer un sentiment communautaire se fondant sur la volonté de s’opposer à la guerre. Alors que les crises se succédaient, elle apprit à répondre à ces situations de troubles internationaux. D’un autre côté, cependant, la performativité de cette opposition à la guerre changeait en fonction de l’implication directe de la France, de l’Allemagne ou de l’Italie dans les crises diplomatiques en cours. Lorsqu’un pays courrait un danger, ses socialistes exprimaient des sentiments de défiance à l’égard des camarades étrangers, ce qui empêchait ponctuellement l’Internationale de prendre des initiatives efficaces contre les dangers de la situation internationale.

Elisa Marcobelli

Journée d’étude : Autour de Georges Haupt et de ses archives : le socialisme européen et l’Internationale

Autour de Georges Haupt et de ses archives : le socialisme européen et l’Internationale

georges_haupt

Université de Rouen Normandie
7 décembre 2016, 10h-18h, Salle A509
Journée proposée dans le cadre du séminaire d’EUROSOC
En partenariat avec le séminaire « Révolution française, révolutions du monde contemporain »
(sous la direction de Michel Biard & Jean-Numa Ducange)

La bibliothèque de la Fondation Maison des sciences de l’Homme (FMSH, Paris) vient de rendre public le fonds d’archives de l’historien Georges Haupt (1928-1978). Ce fonds comprend d’importantes ressources relatives à l’histoire du socialisme européen d’avant la Première Guerre mondiale, notamment sur l’Europe de l’Est et les Balkans. G. Haupt avait conservé une partie significative des archives de Camille Huysmans, homme politique belge qui fut secrétaire du Bureau socialiste international, l’organe de direction de l’Internationale socialiste au début du XX e siècle fondée en 1900. Cette nouvelle documentation permet d’approfondir notre connaissance de l’histoire du socialisme et des débats qui le traversent avant 1914. Cette journée entend faire le point sur des recherches récentes sur le sujet, inspirées par les méthodes d’études proposées par G. Haupt et par les renouveaux proposés par l’histoire transnationale.

Comme la journée de lancement du projet EUROSOC du 15 février 2016, cette journée s’organise en trois temps : Méthodologie / Études de cas / Archives

10h – 10h20 : Jean-Numa Ducange, MCF en Histoire contemporaine, coordinateur d’EUROSOC : État d’avancement du projet EUROSOC
10h20 – 10h35 : Discussion


MÉTHODOLOGIE
10h35 – 11h : Élisa Marcobelli, docteure, EHESS : Les socialistes français, italiens et allemands et la paix avant 1914

11h – 11h15 : Discussion

11h15 – 11h30 : Pause

ÉTUDES DE CAS (1)
11h30 – 12h45 : Présidence Jean-Numa Ducange
Lucie Guesnier, docteure, Université de Paris 1 : Le cas du socialisme roumain
Alexandre Riou, master 2, Université de Rouen : Naissance et développement du socialisme tchèque
Frank-Olivier Chauvin, master 2, Université de Rouen : Les socialistes ottomans et l’héritage révolutionnaire français

12h45 – 13h00 : Discussion

ÉTUDES DE CAS (2)
14h30 – 15h20 : Présidence Michel Biard, directeur du GRHIS

Pierre Alayrac, Master 2, ENS Paris : Le congrès de Londres (1896) : comprendre le déroulement d’un congrès socialiste
Andréa Benedetti, doctorant, Université de Strasbourg : Le Bureau socialiste international : nouvelle approche

15h20 – 15h35 : Discussion

15h35 – 16h : Pause

16h – 17h20 : TABLE RONDE AUTOUR DES ARCHIVES DE GEORGES HAUPT

Présidence : Serge Wolikow, Consortium mondes contemporains

Julien Pomart (Archiviste, FMSH), Maria Grazia Meriggi (Professeure, Université de Bergame),

Michel Dreyfus (Directeur de recherches émérite, CNRS), Julien Hage (MCF, Université de Paris X-Nanterre)

17h20 – 17h45 : Discussions et conclusions

Contact : jean-numa.ducange@univ-rouen.fr

Télécharger le programme.pdf

Solidarity in Crisis: The French, German, and Italian Socialists in the Face of International Crises at the Time of the Second International (1889-1915)

PHD abstract defended on 12 December 2015

Solidarity in Crisis: The French, German, and Italian Socialists in the Face of International Crises at the Time of the Second International (1889-1915)

By Elisa Marcobelli

The events of summer 1914, which led the French Socialists and the German Social Democrats to support de facto the entry into the First World War of their respective countries, have remained engraved in people’s memories and have been historically interpreted in two different ways with regard to the new International. First, the Socialist leaders “betrayed” their own supporters. Second, the support for war represents the “failure” of the very spirit of the International; a spirit which was created to strengthen the principles of transnational solidarity within the working class and help it develop common struggles. By the way, these terms – “failure”, “betrayal” – were directly used by the Socialist parties’ members immediately after the outbreak of the First World War,[1] prior to being confirmed by historians.[2]

It is nonetheless necessary to study the life of the Second International, regardless of what happened in 1914,[3] by reinstating its action against war in the very history of its development, while it was still alive.[4] From this point of view, one cannot speak of failure; it rather succeeded in creating a common feeling based on a desire to oppose war and the ability to respond to dangerous international situations. Nevertheless, analyzing the reactions of the International, and the different Socialist parties which composed it, in the face of the international diplomatic crises of that time[5] reveals certain limits.

In order to do this, we adopt a three-stage approach. First, we demonstrate the International’s growing ability to get an international visibility by organizing its struggle against war. At the time of its creation, the goal of that institution was not to oppose war. For that matter, the Second International’s first congresses paid limited attention to the issues of war and peace, as it can be read in their reports or in the newspaper articles about them. However, this changed over the 1890s. The International’s interest in the issues of war and opposition to war began to increase. The Zurich (1893) and London (1896) Congresses already testified of the particular attention paid to these issues. During this last Congress, it was definitely decided that the May Day demonstration would also aim to publicly display the labor movement’s opposition to war.

Over time, the International started to implement a wide range of practices which were meant to “create” its internationalism: demonstrations and particular rituals on the occasion of congresses, and a series of publications (leaflets, lampoons, manifestos, and starting from 1909, the reports of the International Socialist Bureau) spread among the countries. We have summarized these phenomena, in reference to the historian Kevin J. Callahan, with the term “demonstration culture”. The creation of this demonstration culture is closely connected to the International’s opposition to war. The International’s different public demonstrations progressively became the expression of an opposition to war and this opposition was their raison d’être. As international crises came one after another, the International learned how to react to situations of danger. It better handled the crises’ temporality and managed to give an answer to what was happening at the international level.

In the second part of our research, we analyze what was happening on the scale of the Socialist parties of the three nations. The representatives of the three parties were the protagonists of the birth of an internationalist feeling, apart from what was happening at the level of the International. If we analyze how these debates spread among the three countries, the importance the war and peace issues had in those debates, and how the socialists dealt with them within their countries’ borders, it can be observed that internationalism had not been imposed by the International’s institutions but that international networks were also being formed at the level of ad hoc exchanges between the Socialist representatives of the different countries.

This study of the two levels of internationalism is vital to show how that internationalism subsequently evolved when the European diplomatic situation was disrupted by international crises – This is what we undertook in the third part of the work.

Various observations are highlighted. The International’s capacity to react in the face of crises has a limit: during the 1905 Moroccan crisis, when France or Germany were directly involved in the crises, the International’s capacity to react significantly weakened and slowed down. The result is that the Socialist parties of the different countries sometimes harbored doubts on their foreign comrades’ attitude in the face of the belligerent actions of their respective governments.

Despite this limit, the International learned over the years how to react to these situations of danger. For example, in 1912, the Basel Congress and the different international meetings which were held almost at the same time in the three countries proved that the International had henceforth learned how to make its voice heard in the opposition to war. This was important to the extent that the International thus showed to governments that, in the event of war, they had to take into account the response capacity of organized socialism. The International then did not fail in its opposition to war. On the contrary, it did very well.

The International followed a double temporality: on one hand, its involvement in the protest against the war, born in the 1890s, grew linearly over the years. On the other hand, the years 1911-1914 constituted a special moment in this development; it constituted its peak, so to speak. During these years, the international socialism stage was constantly scattered of solidarity demonstrations between the socialisms of the different countries, which intended to set up a joint opposition to the danger of war.

Our study focuses on the French, German, and Italian cases. We considered it significant to choose the two parties which had the greatest influence in terms of the number of delegates sent to the International’s congresses and initiatives taken in common (manifestos, joint demonstrations) on the international socialism stage. Analyzing Italy enabled us to underscore the importance of France and Germany in the International. Moreover, this analysis also enables us to show that whether or not it was involved in an international crisis did not have any influence in the undertakings the International achieved. Adding Italy in the research necessitates pushing the analyses until 1915, until its entry into war, thus adopting a historical timeline different from those used in the studies on the Second International, which normally end with the beginning of the war in 1914.

In light of these considerations, it then seems that the Second International did not fail: on one hand, it developed around a real defense of peace, which constituted an essential part of its political identity; on the other hand, it can hardly be considered a failure as so many forms of mistrust between national Socialist parties prevented them from becoming closer around a set of concrete actions to avoid war.

Elisa Marcobelli

[1] See LÉNINE Vladimir Illitch‘ Oulianov, Le socialisme et la guerre, Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1952 [1915] and KAUTSKY, Karl, Sozialisten und Krieg: Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte des Sozialismus von den Hussiten bis zum Völkerbund, Prague, Orbis, 1937.

[2] JOLL James, The Second International, 1889-1914, London, 1955, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 184 ; KRIEGEL, Annie, Aux origines du communisme français, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1964, p. 31 ; BECKER, Jean-Jacques, “La IIe Internationale et la guerre”, in ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE DE ROME (dir.), Les Internationales et le problème de la guerre au XXe siècle : actes du colloque, Rome, École française de Rome, 1984, p. 9-25 ; DROZ Jacques (dir.), Histoire générale du socialisme, vol. 2, de 1875 à 1914, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1997, p. 583 ; KRUSE Wolfgang, Krieg und nationale Integration. Eine Neuinterpretation des sozialdemokratischen Burgfriedensschlusses 1914/15, Esse, Klartext, 1993, p. 29.

[3] Thus exiting from what the historian William Mulligan calls the “teological tunnel”, cf. MULLIGAN William, The Origins of First World War, Cambridge, Paperback, 2010, p. 227. Georges Haupt, in his research on the “missed” Vienna Socialist Conference, urged the historiography to relieve the history of the Second International from this sword of Damocles this presumed failure represents, Cf. HAUPT Georges, Le congrès manqué : l’Internationale à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale, Paris, F. Maspero, 1965.

[4] As Arndt Weinrich has pointed out, this is a fairly common trend of the most recent historiography on the origins of war which raises the issue of how 1914 was made possible, rather than why it was possible. Cf. WEINRICH Arndt, “,,Großer Krieg’’ große Ursachen ? Aktuelle Forschungen zu den Ursachen des Ersten Weltkrieges”, Sonderdruck aus Francia. Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte, nº 40, 2013.

[5] The Fashoda Incident (1898), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the first and second Moroccan crises (1905 and 1911), the Italo-Turkish War (1911) and the two Balkan wars (1912-1913).